I n economics, it is standard to consider that there is room for government intervention in the area of environmental protection. This view relies on a basic paradigm: in general, markets work well to reach an optimal use of scarce resources, so that government intervention is useful only for redistributing revenues, or when markets are no longer fulfilling their role effectively. This is precisely what occurs when one has to deal with environmental problems. One of the prerequisites for the smooth operation of markets is the existence of well-defined ownership rights. In the case of environmental resources available through open access, such as air or clean water, these rights are very difficult to assign. Therefore, because air and water belong to no one (or to anyone), economic agents may use them at zero cost, whereas the actual cost of this use for society as a whole is certainly greater. Polluters receive the wrong signal and, because they use these resources without paying the true price, they are encouraged to do so to excess. Left alone, the market mechanism generates too much pollution, and government intervention is legitimate for reducing it to a tolerable threshold.
To that end, government has traditionally used regulation to set limits on the amount of pollution, or to require specific pollution-control technologies. Economists have argued that "market-based instruments," such as taxation or pollution permits, could be more attractive than regulation. 1 These instruments may result in the polluters receiving the right signal, once confronted with the true cost of their actions. In short, from this perspective, consideration of the environment is necessarily associated with a cost increase for companies that have previously used environmental resources with impunity.
During the last decade, however, this paradigm has been challenged by a number of analysts (Gore 1993; Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde 1995) . In particular, Porter argues that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources (material, energy, etc.) , and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may offset the costs of complying with these policies (this is referred to as the Porter Hypothesis 2 ). In other words, firms could be considered "myopic" since they ignore the existence of many "low-hanging fruits," and some government intervention could be useful in helping them identify profitable opportunities.
Many theoretical arguments from the emerging organizational and behavioural economic literature now explain why firms may miss these opportunities. 3 The rationality of the firm may be driven by managers who have motivations and objectives other than profit maximization. They might be risk averse (Kennedy 1994) , resistant to any costly change (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1997) , or rationally bounded (Ambec at al. 2010; Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 1998) . Managers can miss good investment opportunities that are outside the range of their habits and routines or that are perceived as too costly, too risky (for the manager, not for the firm). For instance, Ambec and Barla (2006) discuss the case of a manager with present-biased preferences who procrastinates about profitable but costly investment opportunities ("low hanging fruit"). Since the cost of innovating is "now" while the benefit is "later," a present-biased manager will tend to postpone any investments in innovation. 4 This could be true especially for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), where daily struggles for survival may push aside environmental issues that have long-term consequences (Canadian Federation of Independent Business 2007) . Given the particular situation of SMEs, non-traditional means may be needed to foster innovation and pollution prevention. The Enviroclub initiative in Canada is a good example of an original measure put in place for such a purpose.
The Enviroclub initiative was developed by three federal government agencies (Environment Canada, National Research Council Canada, and Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions) and launched in 2001 in the province of Quebec to
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Canadian PubliC PoliCy -analyse de Politiques, vol. xxxviii, no. 2 2012 assist SMEs in improving their profitability and competitiveness through enhanced environmental performance. An Enviroclub consists of a group of 10 to 15 SMEs, and each firm carries out one profitable pollution prevention project. To support this practical experience, business participants attend four days of workshops, spread over a period of about six months, on various themes related to environmental performance. They also receive technical assistance from a consultant who analyzes the firm's operations and recommends different in-plant projects to prevent pollution and enhance business performance. Each participating firm is committed to implementing at least one of the recommended inplant projects. This type of initiative seems original and, as such, is worth investigating. 5 Given the uniqueness of the Enviroclub approach, it is important for policy-makers to evaluate its outcome thoroughly. Many specialists will argue that a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an adequate and comprehensive approach for this purpose (Boardman et al. 2006) . The objective of this article is to provide a CBA of the Enviroclub initiative for the period 2001-2007 so that policy-makers may see whether such programs are socially desirable. The main costs were the expenses of the three federal agencies, the fee paid by the participating firms, and the investments required for the in-plant projects. Among the benefits, there were energy and raw material savings as well as reductions in different polluting emissions. Since these emissions have no market price, one of our largest challenges was to place a value on them. To do so, we use the "environmental value transfer" method to obtain values from previous relevant studies. We conduct our CBA at three different levels: we consider the costs and benefits first for the whole of society, then from the participating firms' point of view and, finally, from the governments' perspective. We conclude that, whichever perspective we choose, the Enviroclub initiative has been highly beneficial. Huppé (2004) produced an exploratory CBA of the first three years of the program, but he did not try to place a value on the environmental benefits of the program, nor did he evaluate the costs and benefits from other perspectives than that of society as a whole.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly describe the Enviroclub initiative, followed by a discussion of methodological considerations. The next two sections identify and monetize the different costs and benefits. We then present the CBA from the three perspectives mentioned above, and discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis. Finally, we offer concluding remarks.
the enviroClub initiative
Three federal government organizations jointly developed and implemented this pollution prevention program targeting economic returns for SMEs. 6 Given their respective missions, it was natural for them to do so. Environment Canada seeks to implement pollution prevention as the main approach to environmental protection (see Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999) . 7 The National Research Council Canada (NRC) is the Government of Canada's premier organization for research and development. Its Industrial Research Assistance Program seeks to improve manufacturing processes and productivity through technologies that present higher efficiency in resource and energy use. Canada Economic Development promotes economic development in Quebec. Its Sustainable Development Strategy encourages and helps small businesses to adopt sustainable development practices (Canada Economic Development 2003 ).
An Enviroclub is scheduled over a period of eight to ten months and includes a period of prerecruitment, where a recruiting team is formed; the recruitment phase, when businesses identify in-plant projects and are enlisted to form a club; the implementation phase, which includes the two main features of the clubs-workshops and in-plant projects; and the wrap-up, when results are compiled and the club is assessed. Eligible SMEs must have fewer than 200 employees. These firms are involved primarily in the manufacturing sector. The registration fee is $2,500, and the firms cover the cost of their in-plant pollution projects.
An Enviroclub includes workshops undertaken over four non-consecutive days. The main topics covered are
• pollution prevention as a driver of competitiveness and profitability,
• selection and implementation of profitable pollution prevention projects,
• energy efficiency and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
• environmental emergencies,
• environmental management systems, and
• environmental performance as a marketing and communication tool.
Consultants are hired to provide 90 hours of technical assistance to SMEs (paid for by the Enviroclub), helping them to identify, design, and implement their in-plant projects. The participating firm is committed to putting in place at least one of the recommended projects.
Most in-plant projects seek to introduce pollution prevention practices and technologies that relate to product or service changes and improvement, process or technology improvement, input or raw material changes, operating improvements, or on-site reuse and recycling. Such projects must increase the SME's economic profits, or improve its competitiveness and export capability by opening new export markets. Projects can generate environmental benefits through reduced emissions of toxic and priority substances, as well as substances on Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory, and through reduced GHG emissions, ozone-depleting substances, and acid rain precursors. Alternatively, projects can reduce the consumption of input materials, natural resources, or energy. A few projects were also aimed at implementing an environmental management system (EMS) within the firm. For these projects, we have the costs involved, but it was very difficult to identify the exact benefits.
Between 2001 and 2007, 22 clubs were created in the different administrative regions of Quebec. These clubs involved 277 SMEs. When our database was built, 211 firms had completed the program, implementing 216 in-plant projects. The distribution of firms by industrial sector is shown in Table  1 , the number of in-plant projects implemented per year in Table 2 , and the distribution of the types of projects in Table 3 . Following the recommendations of an internal audit early in the development phase of the Enviroclub, a performance measurement framework centred on environmental and economic benefits was introduced into the program design. The framework includes outcome indicators divided into economic and environmental indicators. Economic indicators are based on the reduction in operating costs and on the investment to implement the project. They include the recurring savings and the return on investment (simple payback period). Environmental indicators include the reduction in use of raw material and water. The reduction in use of energy is recorded for electricity and for six types of fuels. To calculate the atmospheric emissions related to energy savings, the consultants used a set of conversion factors appropriate for each type of fuel and for electricity. These conversion factors are based on the literature and on the particular situation of Quebec (e.g., electricity coming mainly from hydro-power). 8 The consultants were required to identify during project definition the list of output indicators that have to be followed up. Environment Canada reviews the list to ensure consistency with aggregated indicators. The consultant and the SME then collect data before and after the project and report results in a standardized form in a results database. Outcome indicators are measured through a questionnaire administered during a site visit at least one year after project completion. The visit also serves to confirm project results. All data regarding the initiative outcomes were compiled in a central database at Environment Canada. The database was made available to us by the official responsible for the program at Environment Canada.
methodoloGiCal issues
In a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of an activity, project, policy or, as in this case, a program, one seeks to find out whether the program is welfareimproving for the whole of society, that is, whether it generates more benefits than costs. A CBA generally involves four main steps: (a) identify the costs and benefits induced by the program; (b) monetize all the costs and benefits so as to compare them on the same basis; (c) express the costs and benefits in dollars of the same year (discounted), since a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future; and (d) perform a sensitivity analysis to assess how the conclusion of the investigation is sensitive to certain assumptions made throughout the study.
In our case, a number of issues were raised at each step. Ideally, to identify properly the costs and benefits of a given program, we should compare a scenario "with the program" to a counterfactual scenario "without the program." For instance, one could determine the benefits of the initiative through a "cross-section" statistical or econometric analysis comparing plants involved in the initiative with plants that are not involved (e.g., Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008), or through a "longitudinal" statistical analysis comparing the situation "before and after" in plants involved in the initiative (e.g., Lanoie and Tavenas 1996) . Unfortunately, such approaches were not possible to implement here. As will be shown below, we identify 17 types of benefits (inputs, raw material, water, different types of energy, atmospheric emissions, etc.); it would thus have been extremely cumbersome to collect the appropriate data, and to design and estimate 17 econometric models for a cross-section or a longitudinal analysis. Instead, we rely on self-reported savings.
In other words, we have to "believe" what the firms are reporting and assume that, without the Enviroclub, the savings would not have occurred. We are fairly confident in these self-reported data for at least four reasons. First, the data-gathering mechanism was precise and formal. In particular, the follow-up was done one year after completion of the in-plant projects, so that all short-term adjustments influencing the outcome of projects took place before data were collected. Second, firms involved in the initiative have no incentive to lie; they have no financial or fiscal gains in exaggerating the benefits of the program. Third, discussions with consultants involved in the initiative indicated that, in almost all cases, the in-plant projects would not have taken place without the Enviroclub; managers were just not aware of many environmental issues and of "win-win" solutions. And fourth, in line with this previous argument, almost all in-plant projects were economically profitable and should have been adopted by profit-maximizing firms without government intervention. 9 To identify the program benefits, we also considered how long the benefits would last. For instance, in most cases, in-plant projects have led to reductions in use of material, energy consumption, emissions, and so on, and these reductions will likely continue beyond one year. There are very few arguments justifying a specific number of years, and so we have to use certain scenarios. We do not have the age of the firms involved in the Enviroclub initiative, but we know that they are likely to be mature companies that have passed the "survival threshold" where many new ventures fail and go bankrupt. Indeed, new firms are not likely to be concerned about "less crucial" issues, such as environmental protection. In our cases, firms are likely to be long-lived, as are the benefits from in-plant projects. As in the work of Huppé (2004), we set our base case at seven years, but we also look at three other scenarios: five, ten, and 15 years.
In monetizing costs and benefits, one has to refer to the real opportunity costs of inputs or resources. This implies that the analysis has to abstract, as far as possible, from any taxes, subsidies, or interferences that affect the price mechanism. 10 Therefore, in our calculations, when considering the price of certain resources, such as energy or materials, we took away taxes or subsidies whenever feasible.
Of course, the main issue in monetizing the benefits is placing a value on the reduction of polluting emissions, since these are not priced by the market. There is now a vast literature on methods for valuing non-market goods, such as the quality of the environment, leisure time, or health and safety. These methodologies include revealed preference methods and contingent valuation. 11 As will be seen below, we deal with eight different types of emissions, and it is beyond the scope of this research to determine the value of each emission type in the context of Quebec. We thus use the environmental value transfer method, transferring environmental value estimates from previous studies. As discussed by Spash and Vatn (2006) , it is legitimate to do so when one can find high-quality studies covering similar environmental goods carried out in a similar geographical and institutional context. We rely mainly on recent American studies published in peer-reviewed journals. For greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the range of estimates is fairly broad, and we use a lower and upper bound in our calculations.
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Finally, the choice of a discount factor can be controversial. We follow the recommendation of the Treasury Board of Canada (2007) , and use a real discount rate of 8 percent. We check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the discount rate with an interval of +2 and -2 percent. Our sensitivity analysis allows the duration of benefits to vary, as well as the discount rate and the price of GHG emissions.
the Costs
There are four main categories of costs involved in this program. First, we have the administrative costs covered by the three agencies involved in the program. These were estimated by Huppé (2004) and extrapolated for the years 2004 to 2007. Second, there are expenses related to the promotion of the program and the recruitment of participants. After discussion with program leaders, we estimated these expenses at $350,000 per year. Third, the $2,500 fee paid by the participants has to be included, plus the amount paid to the consultants for their technical assistance (90 hours on site). Finally, the costs involved in the in-plant projects were estimated and reported by all participants; these represent about 80 percent of total costs. Table 4 reports the total costs of the program for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . In general, we feel confident about these figures, so that we do not perform a sensitivity analysis on that side of the equation.
the beneFits
As shown in Table 5 , there are three main categories of benefits from the in-plant projects: (a) energy savings, (b) raw material savings, and (c) reduction 
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Canadian PubliC PoliCy -analyse de Politiques, vol. xxxviii, no. 2 2012 in polluting emissions. This last category can be divided into three subcategories: atmospheric emissions, water effluents, and wastes. The first two categories (energy and raw material savings) provide direct benefits to the firms involved in the program, while the third provides benefits to society as a whole. Table 5 provides the energy and raw material savings as well as the emissions reductions in quantities, and the following discussion presents the "price" chosen for monetizing each category of benefits.
Energy. Quantities of electricity and of various fossil fuels (natural gas, propane, diesel, etc.) were saved through the in-plant projects. To price the quantities of fossil fuels, we use the average yearly price in Quebec as provided by MJ Ervin & Associates, 12 and we subtract taxes. For electricity, we refer to the M rate used by Hydro-Québec for medium-sized firms. 13 Raw materials. Raw materials were saved, especially wood and water (on average 1.3 million cubic metres per year). Other types of raw materials were also saved, such as plastic or steel, but are not documented in our database. The wood price we chose is the least expensive one: the average annual "softwood lumber, Toronto green" composite price (MRNF 2007) . Regarding water price, we use the only study available on the valuation of water for industrial purposes (Dachraoui and Harchaoui 2004) . Their estimate is $0.55 (C$, 1996) per cubic metre, which is not far from the price charged by Quebec municipalities using water meter systems ($0.51 per cubic metre; Environment Canada 2008).
Polluting emissions. Polluting emissions were reduced in three areas: atmospheric emissions, water effluents, and waste (hazardous and domestic). Five types of air pollutants were affected by the in-plant projects: particulate matter (PM 2.5 and PM 10 ), nitrogen oxides (NO x ), sulphur oxides (SO x ), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and greenhouse gases (GHG). As mentioned above, there is no market price for the first four types, and so we use the environmental value transfer method. In fact, our prices for these pollutants come from Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) . This American study is the most sophisticated exercise we have encountered on this topic. The authors use a simulating model, the Air Pollution Emissions Experiments and Policy (APEEP) analysis, to value the marginal damages associated with air pollution. These damages include impacts on agriculture, forests, ecosystems, buildings, and human health. A particularly relevant aspect of this study is that it provides values for rural and urban areas; not surprisingly, the value is much higher (often twice as much) in urban areas (see Table 6 ).
Table 6
Marginal Cost According to Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) Source: The database compiles particulates differently from Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) . In fact, Enviroclub compiled PM 10 as being particles with a diameter of less than 10 microns, so this classification includes both PM 10 and PM 2.5 . In order to place a value on PM 10 as identified in Enviroclub, we take the average of the two prices as estimated in the Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) study.
Paul Lanoie and Alexandra Rochon-Fabien
We use the rural values since most companies in our sample are located in rural or semi-rural regions. Following the principles for value transfer from Spash and Vatn (2006) , we find that the Muller and Mendelsohn study satisfies our purposes. It is of very high quality (published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management), it evaluates exactly the pollutants we need, and the geographical and institutional contexts are similar (especially for rural areas). Hahn and Cecot (2009) , in their cost-benefit analysis of ethanol production, also use results from Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) .
For GHG emissions, we refer to two metaanalyses. On one hand, Tol (2008) examines 200 estimations in 47 different studies. In doing so, he gives less weight to older studies and those published in less well-known publications. 14 He ends up with a value of $23 per ton of CO 2 (US$, 1995). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) provides a value for a ton of GHG based on about 100 estimates published in peer-reviewed journals. They end up with a value of $11 per ton of CO 2 (US$, 2004). As these two values are fairly different, to be cautious, we will use $11 per ton in our base case, and we will conduct a sensitivity analysis using the figure from Tol (2008) .
Regarding water effluents, we found no North American studies that provided the value of these emissions. As a proxy, we took the abatement cost of the Montreal wastewater treatment plant, the largest in Quebec: $0.054 per cubic metre (C$, 2001 ). 15 It was not possible to obtain data for each wastewater treatment plant associated with each company in our sample.
Finally, emissions of hazardous and domestic wastes were reduced. As in the case of water effluents, we are forced to use the abatement cost as a proxy. In Quebec, the public agency in charge of waste management, reuse, and recycling, Recyc Quebec, estimates that the average cost of treating hazardous waste such as paint, oil, and grease is $2,000 per tonne. 16 For domestic waste, the Quebec Department of Sustainable Development, Environment and Parks has estimated that the average cost of using landfill sites is $53 per tonne (MDDEP 2008) . As discussed by Tietenberg (2007) , abatement or replacement cost is generally a lower bound of an environmental value. Table 7 presents a summary of all the benefits.
the Cost-beneFit analysis As we mentioned in the introduction, we will present a cost-benefit analysis from the perspectives of society, participating firms, and government. In our base case scenario, the discount rate is 8 percent, we expect the benefits to last seven years, and we consider a price of GHG emissions of $11 per ton (US$, 2004) . We provide the results in constant Canadian dollars of 2000. Table 8 presents the base case scenario as well as our sensitivity analysis, allowing the discount rate and the period during which benefits are recorded to change.
The net present value (NPV) for the base case is strongly positive at $52,751,129.54 with an internal rate of return of 47 percent. Not surprisingly, since the benefits continue to occur after the costs are incurred, a lower discount rate places relatively more weight on the benefits and results in a higher NPV, while a higher discount rate results in a lower NPV. Of course, when the period of time for which benefits are recorded is longer, the NPV rises, and vice versa. Finally, we look at the base case scenario when the value of CO 2 emissions is set at $23 (US$, 1995) according to Tol (2008) . In line with our expectations, the NPV is higher, at $56.2 million (C$, 2000) in our base case when we give a higher value to CO 2 emissions. 17 Overall, it seems that the Enviroclub program has been highly profitable for Canadian society. Even in the most pessimistic cases (high discount rate, shorter period of benefits), the profitability is still fairly strong. We now compute the NPV from the participating firms' point of view. In this case, the main private expenses are the contribution of $2,500 to the program and the investments in in-plant projects. The main private benefits are the savings in energy and raw materials. 18 For raw materials, we only include wood. Since most Quebec municipalities do not charge for water, any reduction in the use of water does not improve a firm's cash flow. We present the base case scenario as well as the sensitivity analysis. In this case, since the value of the CO 2 emissions is not relevant, we do not consider it in the sensitivity analysis.
Once again, the NPV is fairly high, at more than $21.5 million in our base case scenario (see Table 9 ). The same patterns as those discussed above are observable when we allow for changes in the discount rate or the period of benefits. Given the nature of the Enviroclub program, which places the emphasis on profitable and competitiveness-enhancing in-plant projects, this result is not surprising. It suggests, as often mentioned in the literature on environmental management (Ambec and Lanoie 2008; Porter and van der Linde 1995) , that "low-hanging fruits" abound. $45,339,319.92 $39,529,220.11 $34,602,256.33 7 years $61,515,904.57 $52,751,129.54 $45,460,360.61 10 years $82,821,027.06 $69,377,261.20 $58,509,648.55 15 years $111,686,559.02 $90,304,962.47 $73,797,205.65 Source: Compiled by authors. $17,880,699.01 $15,343,103.40 $13,205,028.02 7 years $25,534,131.74 $21,573,429.54 $18,299,296.51 10 years $35,685,689.65 $29,464,011.55 $24,465,866.62 15 years $49,595,561.60 $39,507,384.35 $31,770,316.33 Source: Compiled by authors.
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Finally, from the governments' point of view, the main costs are the expenses to recruit enterprises in the program, the cost of the consultant, and the administrative expenses, while the main benefits are the reductions in polluting emissions and water consumption. Furthermore, from a fiscal point of view, when firms save on energy and raw materials, fewer taxes are collected by government, but when these firms make more profits by saving on these items, they pay more taxes on their business income.
Table 10 presents our base case scenario and the sensitivity analysis. Not surprisingly, the NPV is also strongly positive from the government point of view in the base case scenario at $36.5 million (C$, 2000) , as well as in the sensitivity analysis. When the value of CO 2 is set at a higher level according to Tol (2008) , the NPV goes up to $39.2 million (C$, 2000) in our base case. Overall, this suggests that the program has created a win-win situation for both the governments and the firms.
disCussion and ConClusion
The objective of this article was to provide a costbenefit analysis of the Enviroclub initiative. This program was developed by three federal government agencies-Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions, Environment Canada, and the National Research Council Canada-to assist small and medium-sized enterprises in improving their profitability and competitiveness through enhanced environmental performance. An Enviroclub consists of a group of 10 to 15 SMEs involved in training sessions on environmental management and carrying out at least one profitable in-plant pollution prevention project.
After describing the program, we identified and monetized its principal costs and benefits. The costs were related mainly to the expenses of the three federal agencies, the fee paid by the participating firms, and the investments required for the in-plant projects. Among the benefits, there were energy and raw material savings, as well as reductions in different polluting emissions. Since these emissions have no market price, one of our largest challenges was to place a value on them. For this purpose, we used the "environmental value transfer" method to obtain values from previous relevant studies.
We conducted our CBA at three different levels. We considered the costs and benefits first for society as a whole, then from the participating firms' point of view and, finally, from the governments' perspective. We concluded that, whichever point of view we chose, the Enviroclub initiative has been highly profitable. $14,996,410.58 $10,242,011.48 $7,313,192.64 7 years $36,725,499.98 $36,463,452.90 $35,263,213.45 10 years $35,117,986.30 $26,337,241.42 $20,265,252.65 15 years $50,399,823.88 $37,466,833.02 $28,433,683.03 Source: Compiled by authors.
In general, we consider that our estimates are fairly conservative and our results probably represent a lower bound of the actual net benefits. We may be underestimating the net benefits in at least five ways. First, some firms participated in the program in late 2006 and in 2007, but had not completed their in-plant projects by the time our database was compiled. For these firms, we have some of the costs in our data but no benefits. Second, we did not account for the benefits from the environmental management system (EMS) projects since their specific outcome was very difficult to identify. These EMS projects likely led to some changes, such as reductions in energy use and waste. Third, in terms of raw materials, we accounted only for wood and water, while other types of inputs were saved but not documented. Fourth, some projects resulted in a better quality of life in the plant through less dust, less noise, or better air quality, but we were not able to quantify those aspects. Finally, given the positive outcome of most in-plant projects, it is likely that many SMEs learned a lot from their participation in the program and have implemented other projects that were not accounted for in the data.
From a policy perspective, this paper raises some questions. First, it shows that the traditional "command and control" regulatory approach can be very well complemented by other voluntary approaches, especially for SMEs. Indeed, while traditional regulation may be an option with a small number of large enterprises, there is a limit on the resources that regulatory bodies can put into enforcement in the face of tens or hundreds of thousands of potential small businesses requiring regulation. Second, it shows that information and training is still lacking for improving SMEs' environmental performance. Facing daily struggles to survive, SMEs are likely to have little time or expertise and few resources to devote to environmental issues. The fact that many opportunities to reduce both polluting emissions and costs were missed demonstrates that environmental issues are simply not well understood by SME managers. Any effort to provide them with more information and expertise on best practices should be welcome. Third, in the same vein, this paper shows policy-makers that it is possible to reduce pollution without major costs for firms; this may be particularly true for smaller firms, suggesting that more demanding environmental policies may not be detrimental to the economy.
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